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Abstract
The purpose of this Article is to examine U.S. hegemony in Latin America by looking at the
impact of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (”FTAA”) negotiations on U.S.-Latin American
relations. Does the FTAA process confirm the claim that “since World War II ... the general trend
has always been for the United States to exert a great degree of influence over Latin American
countries...”? Does it mark the beginning of a new, more balanced relationship between the United
States and Latin America, a mature partnership based on reciprocity, mutuality of interests and
mutual respect? Alternatively, are the United States and Latin America growing apart? Can Latin
America say ”good-bye” to the United States and establish a presence of its own on the world
stage?

MERCOSUR, THE FREE TRADE AREA OF
THE AMERICAS, AND THE FUTURE OF
U.S. HEGEMONY IN LATIN AMERICA*
Dr. Mario E. Carranza**
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Article is to examine U.S. hegemony in
Latin America by looking at the impact of the Free Trade Area
of the Americas ("FTAA") negotiations on U.S.-Latin American
relations. Does the FTAA process confirm the claim that
"[s] ince World War II... the general trend has always been for
the United States to exert a great degree of influence over Latin
American countries.. ."?' Does it mark the beginning of a new,
more balanced relationship between the United States and Latin
America, a mature partnership based on reciprocity, mutuality
of interests and mutual respect? Alternatively, are the United
States and Latin America growing apart? Can Latin America say
"good-bye" to the United States and establish a presence of its
own on the world stage?
Active opposition to the FTAA by civil society constituencies
in several countries of the Western hemisphere, including the
United States, and recent U.S. protectionist measures, do not
bode well for the successful completion of the FTAA in 2005.
On the other hand, the collapse of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") global trade talks at Cancun in September 2003
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creates new incentives for the United States to complete the
FTAA talks on schedule in order to avoid trade discrimination in
Southern Cone Common Market ("MERCOSUR") countries
(Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) if they strike a free
trade deal with the European Union and the FTAA talks collapse, or are extended until 2007.
I. THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE
AMERICAS NEGOTIATIONS
The FTAA negotiations were formally launched at the Second Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile, on April 18-19,
1998. The FTAA was originally conceived as an extension of the
NAFTA model to the rest of the Western Hemisphere. However,
the inability of President Clinton to obtain "fast-track" authority
from the U.S. Congress and the victory of the Brazil/
MERCOSUR position during the negotiations to negotiate from
1994 through 1998 eliminated the NAFTA extension approach
(also known as the hub-and-spokes model) and established a more
balanced format for the negotiations. At the Trade Ministerial
Meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica, on March 19, 1998, the United
States had to make significant concessions. First, the FTAA process would be a single undertaking (where nothing is agreed until
everything is agreed upon). Second, countries can negotiate as
members of a sub-regional trading bloc and "the FTAA can coexist with bilateral and sub-regional agreements, to the extent
that the rights and obligations under these agreements are not
covered by or go beyond the rights and obligations of the
FTAA."2 As Gilmore notes, "the United States position is considerably weaker in this format than under the 'hub and spokes'
approach, as it will face the growing economic power of Brazil
and MERCOSUR in achieving many of its trade objectives."3 Although the United States accepted the creation of a negotiating
group for agriculture - a key problem for many Latin American
countries seeking to sell in the U.S. market - most of the other
negotiating groups deal with the deep integration agenda of the
United States. Since 1998, nine technical working groups have
2. Free Trade of the Americas: Fourth Trade Ministerial Joint Declaration, San
Jose, Costa Rica, Mar. 19, 1998, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/minsterials/costa_
e.asp [hereinafter Ministerial Joint Declaration of San Jose].
3. David M. Gilmore, Free Trade Area of the Americas: Is it Desirable?, 31 U. MiAMi
INTER-AM. L. REv. 383, 385-86 (2000).
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been involved in the FTAA negotiations: (1) market access, (2)
agriculture, (3) services, (4) investment, (5) government procurement, (6) intellectual property rights, (7) subsidies, antidumping, and countervailing duties, (8) dispute settlement,
and (9) competition policy.4
Although the FTAA talks have made significant progress at
the technical level, considerable political obstacles remain to
achieve a FTAA on schedule in January 2005. The commitment
to make concessions, especially, but not only on the part of the
United States and Brazil is still missing.
As Poitras notes, "finding common ground between the
NAFTA three and the rest of the [S] tates in the Americas could
ultimately transform hemispheric relations.''

However, making

NAFTA compatible with the other sub-regional blocs in the
Western hemisphere is a formidable undertaking. MERCOSUR
and NAFTA follow different models of regional integration.
MERCOSUR is an ambitious project to become a customs union
and a common market, whereas NAIFTA is a free trade area
which allows the United States to pursue its deep integration
agenda with Mexico and Canada through very detailed governing clauses. The NAFTA treaty is very broad in scope and
extremely detailed, with twenty-two chapters, 295 articles, and
ninety annexes. In contrast, the Treaty of Asuncion which created MERCOSUR in March 1991 has only twenty-four articles.
The Southern Cone grouping is still loosely organized, with a
strong inter-governmental component, even after the Protocol
of Ouro Preto, which gave MERCOSUR international personality. If MERCOSUR survives the FTAA negotiations, it will probably establish supranational institutions resembling those of the
European Union (the "EU"). In contrast, the United States is
unlikely to accept the creation of a supranational governing
body in NAFTA.
Even if the FTAA negotiations can bridge the gap between
NAFTA and MERCOSUR, formidable obstacles remain to
achieve a balanced agreement between the thirty-four participating countries. The greatest obstacle is the asymmetric distribu4. Id. at 410-11; J. Steven Jarreau, Negotiating Trade Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere: The Free Trade Area of the Americas, 13 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 57, 65-70 (1999).
5. GuY POITRAS, INVENTING NORTH AMERICA: CANADA, MEXICO, AND THE UNITED
STATES

127 (2001).
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tion of power in the Western Hemisphere: "the US economy,
for example, is 10 times larger than that of Brazil, the second
biggest economy in the hemisphere, and almost 100 times larger
than the combined total of all of the countries of Central America
6
and the Caribbean.
II. HEMISPHERIC REGIONALISM AND U.S. HEGEMONY
From the perspective of the U.S. government and big business interests, the FTAA offers a unique opportunity to pry open
the MERCOSUR market (as U.S. exports and imports from the
MERCOSUR region grew steadily in the 1990s), while making
permanent the rules of the neo-liberal game; the so-called
"Washington Consensus", that became the dominant ideological
discourse in the region in the 1990s. 7 As Schott puts it, "US
firms have a U.S. $50 billion bet on the future of the
MERCOSUR economies."8 The FTAA project is aimed at locking in a deep integration agenda that if implemented would
amount to the virtual annexation of the Latin American economies to the U.S. economy, much in the way NAFTA converted
the Mexican economy in an appendix of the U.S. economy. A
NAFTA-style FTAA with a WTO-plus format would eliminate all
the existing barriers to U.S. foreign investment in the region,
extending international rules (or trade disciplines) from trade to
investment. The comprehensive FTAA sought by the United
States would open the Latin American markets for a wide range
of U.S. service industries, while eliminating national restrictions
on government procurement and establishing trade courts in
which U.S. multinational corporations would be able to sue the
Latin American governments over health, labor, and environmental laws. A NAFTA-style FTAA would also eliminate differences in national regulatory regimes that have discriminatory ef6. JEFFREYJ. SCHOTT, PROSPECTS FOR FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 2 (2001).
7. The " Washington Consensus" promotes full reliance on market forces to allocate
resources. It covers three major areas of economic policymaking: macroeconomic stability ("fiscal discipline"), a reduced government role in the economy (deregulation
and privatization of state enterprises), and greater openness to the outside: elimination
of barriers to trade while attracting foreign direct investment. See generallyJOHN WiLLIAMSON, THE PROGRESS OF POLIcy REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA (1990).
8. Jeffrey Schott, The United States, Mercosur and the Free Trade Area of the Americas, at
8, prepared for conference on New Challenges for Regional Integration, Buenos Aires,
Argentina, (Oct. 3, 2002).
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fects on trade and investment, such as rules governing intellectual property, or discriminating against foreign competition.
A. The Reassertion of U.S. Hegemony Thesis
Several scholars argue that the asymmetric nature of U.S.Latin American relations and U.S. overwhelming structural
power over the region make it impossible to achieve a mature
partnership between the United States and Latin America. As
Mace and Belanger note:
[T]he extremely dominant position of the United States in
the Americas .. .[has several implications]:
First, U.S. dominance means that hemispheric regionalism
makes very little sense without U.S. involvement. Second, it
means that the United States is the only country in the region
with the capacity to push and mold continental integration
the way it wants, provided that it has the political will to do so
and the necessary domestic support. Third, no other country
can hope to challenge the hegemonic role of the United
States on an individual basis.9
The theoretical challenge is to determine what kind of hegemony the United States is exercising over South America (in
contrast to the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico) in the
post-Cold War era. There are two schools of thought:
First, the recharged hegemony thesis argues that "[t] he end of
the Cold War has if anything strengthened the drive in Washington to consolidate its informal empire in Latin America." 10
MERCOSUR would be just an instrument to achieve that goal,
serving the function "of more thoroughly incorporating . . .
[member countries] within the world capitalist system while preserving their subordinate status in that system."'1 From this perspective, MERCOSUR is not an autonomous project of regional
integration and is destined to perish, absorbed by the Free
Trade Area of the Americas; or to become irrelevant, after the
9. Gordon Mace & Louis Belanger, The Structural Contexts of HemisphericRegionalism:
Power, Trade, Political Culture, and Economic Development, in THE AMERICAS IN TRANSITION:
THE CONTOURS OF REGIONALISM 42 (Gordon Mace & Louis Belanger eds., 1999) [hereinafter AMERICAS IN TRANSITION].
10. JAMES PETRAS & MoRRIS MORLEY, LATIN AMERICAN IN THE TIME OF CHOLERA:
ELECTORAL POLITICS, MARKET ECONOMICS, AND PERMANENT CRISIS 47 (1992).
11. Donald G. Richards, Dependent Development and Regional Integration: A Critical
Examination of the Southern Cone Common Market, 24 LAT. AM. PERSP. 133, 133 (1997).

1034

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 27:1029

successful conclusion of the Doha round of global free trade negotiations.
James Petras has argued that the United States "is pushing
to extend and deepen its control [of Latin America] via the
FTAA."1 2 According to Petras, the FTAA is part of the U.S. "imperial project" to consolidate "client regimes" in Latin
America.1" A NAFTA-style FTAA would allow the United States
to compensate the relative decline of its position in the world
economy by reasserting U.S. hegemony in the Western hemisphere. The U.S. growing international debt burden, now close
to US$3 trillion, is approaching 30% of the U.S. GDP, forcing
the United States to seek new markets for U.S. exports in order
to reduce the U.S. trade deficit and current account deficit.'"
From this perspective, the U.S. rationale for the FTAA is to gain
privileged access to MERCOSUR (where Brazil is the big prize)
before the sub-regional bloc manages to strike a free trade deal
with the European Union. In a world of competing regional
trading blocs, the FTAA would allow the United States to use
Latin America "as a staging ground for an impending battle for
the world market among the leading centers of capitalist
' 15
power."
The United States is far from having consolidated its "informal empire" in Latin America. In the 1990s, there was an inherent contradiction between the ideological power of the United
States (acceptance of the Washington Consensus by the Latin
American political elites) and its inability to fund the recovery of
the ravaged Central American economies; or to facilitate the recovery of the South American economies through large-scale
flows of U.S. economic aid and/or significant debt reduction. In
the early 2000s, the Washington Consensus had lost legitimacy, especially after the United States decided not to help Argentina
avoid default on its external debt, despite Argentina's strong
commitment to the Washington Consensus in the 1990s.
The second school of thought is hegemony by default. Peter
12. James Petras, U.S. Offensive in Latin America: Coups, Retreats, and Radicalization,
available at http://www monthlyreview.org/0502petras.htm.
13. See id.
14. See Sherle R. Schwenninger, Revamping American Grand Strategy, 20 WORLD
POL'YJ. 25, 38 (2003).
15. JAMES PETRAS & HENRY VELTMEYER, GLOBALIZATION UNMASKED:
THE 21ST CENTURY 78 (2001).

IMPERIALISM IN
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Smith has argued that after the Cold War the United States reasserted its role of regional hegemon in the Western hemisphere
through a process of default, resulting from:
a systematic retreat by extrahemispheric rivals. [...] This occurred not so much because the end of the Cold War provoked the United States to do anything particularly bold, innovative, or effective; it happened, instead, because outside
powers withdrew from the Americas and directed their attention elsewhere. 16

There are several problems with this interpretation. Arguably, Smith exaggerates the importance of the withdrawal of
outside powers from South America, which may have been a
temporary phenomenon, as shown by the European Union's renewed interest in the region during the mid through late 1990s,
culminating with the EU-Latin American Summit of June 1999
in Rio dejaneiro. Smith overlooks the furious EU-U.S. competition for emerging markets in Latin America and Asia, the loss of
momentum of the hub-and-spokes model of Western hemisphere
regional integration, and the strengthening of the Brazil/
MERCOSUR position on the format for the FTAA negotiations,
after the meeting of the hemisphere's trade ministers at Belo
Horizonte in May 1997.17
The hegemony by default thesis relies heavily on the asymmetric nature of the relationship between the United States and
Latin America:
These undertakings [bilateral or minilateral U.S. trade talks
with Latin American countries] further reaffirmed the power
of the United States. These would not be conversations
among equals. They would be highly asymmetrical negotiations (the U.S. economy is approximately 175 times larger
than that of Central America, 140 times larger than Chile's,
and 11 times larger than all of MERCOSUR's). i8
16. Smith, Regional Integration, supra note 1, at 33-34.
17. At the meeting, the United States attempted to speed up the negotiations for
the FTAA, proposing to start talks on rapid tariff reductions. The idea was rejected by
the MERCOSUR countries, arguing that U.S. non-tariff barriers pose significant obstacles to MERCOSUR exports in the U.S. market. In the end, the MERCOSUR position
prevailed, and the United States had to make significant concessions. See Ground Rules
for FTAA Agreed: MERCOSUR Stance Carries the Day as Washington Cedes, LAT. AM. WKLv.
REP. 136, Mar. 24, 1998.
18. Peter H. Smith, From NAFTA to FTAA? Paths toward Hemispheric Integration, in
NAFTA IN THE NEW MILLENIUM 478 (EdwardJ. Chambers & Peter H. Smith eds., 2002).
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Regime theorists argue that there is no need for a multilateral regime when there are extreme power disparities between a
hegemonic power and smaller powers because the hegemon will
rely on its superior relational power to impose its will through
independent decision making or, at the most, bilateral arrangements. 9 If Smith is correct, the United States does not really
need the FTAA to exercise hegemony in the Western hemisphere. Bilateral free trade agreements ("FTA's"), such as the
one signed with Chile on June 6, 2003, would allow the United
States to obtain concessions from individual countries without
going through the cumbersome FTAA process.
An alternative interpretation is that although asymmetry is
an essential characteristic of U.S.-South American relations, the
dramatic rise in the relative power of Brazil since the 1970s and
the structural problems facing the U.S. economy make it possible for MERCOSUR to narrow its current gap in GDP with the
United States in the next decades.2 0 The asymmetric distribution of structural power in favor of the United States in the Western hemisphere does not automatically translate into U.S. hegemony. Coercive leadership is not the same as hegemony by
consent. 2 I The ability of the United States to exercise hegemony
by consent has been damaged by the unfulfilled promises of the
neo-liberal reforms promoted by the Washington Consensus in
the 1990s. On the other hand, the relative decline of U.S. hegemony in the globalized post-Cold War international economy
is a serious structural constraint on the ability of the United
States to assert its authority over the rest of the Western hemisphere in economic matters, despite the structural power of its
U.S. $10 trillion economy.2 2 The United States may be the
19. See Arthur Stein, Coordinationand Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, 36
299, 301 (1982); Donald Crone, Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganization of
the Pacific PoliticalEconomy, 45 WORLD POLITICS 501, 504 (1993).
20. See MAuO E. CARRANZA, SOUTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AREA OR FREE TRADE
INT'L ORG.

AREA OF THE AMERICAS?

OPEN REGIONALISM AND THE FUTURE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC

INTEGRATION IN SOUTH AMERICA

167-69 (2000) [hereinafter

CARRANZA, OPEN REGIONAL-

ISM]. As of 2000, MERCOSUR's GDP was U.S. $900.9 billion, while the United States'

GDP was U.S. $9,882.8 billion. See World Bank, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002:
BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS 236-37 (2001).
21. See Duncan Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, 39 INT'L ORG. 579,
582 (1985). " [W] hen power is distributed asymmetrically but hegemony is exercised in
ways that do not benefit all states, subordinate [S]tates will chafe under the (coercive)
leadership." Id.
22. See ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 347
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world's most powerful country in terms of military capabilities.
However, its economic weaknesses, including dependence on
foreign capital in order to finance current account deficits, impair its ability to exercise hegemony even in Latin America (its
traditional sphere of influence) thus opening up a window of
opportunity for Latin American countries to have independent
foreign economic policies.
Neither the Petras & Morley thesis of a recharged U.S. hegemony over Latin America nor Peter Smith's hegemony by default
thesis tell the whole story of post-Cold War U.S.-Latin American
relations. Both Petras & Morley and Smith exaggerate U.S. domination of South America and are unable to explain the autonomous foreign policy behavior of Brazil and her MERCOSUR
partners.
B. Hegemonic Stability Theory and U.S. Hegemony
During the Cold War, there was a significant amount of
literature on the relationship between global hegemony and international cooperation.2 3 The hegemonic stability theory was an attempt to explain U.S. hegemony in the Western-dominated international economic order and the relationship between regimes
and international cooperation in different issue areas.2 4
The two central propositions of hegemonic stability theory are:
(1) An international hegemon (primus inter pares), can (a)
largely impose and enforce its rules and its wishes in the
international political economy (free trade during Pax
Britannicaand Pax Americana) and (b) maintain international peace, establishing
a security framework that pre25
vents great power wars.
(2) The presence of a single, strongly dominant actor in international politics leads to collectively desirable
out26
comes for all states in the international system.
(1987). The "declinist" approach dominated the scholarly debate about U.S. hegemony in the mid-1980s, when U.S. control of the Western capitalist economy seemed to
be slipping away in the face of an increasingly unified European Community and a
threatening Japanese economy.

23. See ROBERT 0.

KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY:

WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY

COOPERATION AND DiscoRD IN THE

(1984).

24. See Snidal, supra note 21.

25.

CARRANZA, OPEN REGIONALISM

supra note 20, at 153.

26. Id. (citing Snidal, supra note 21, at 579).
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The novelty of hegemonic stability theory is the claim that
smaller States gain even more than the international hegemon
when the latter provides the public good of leadership for the
emergence of a stable international regime of free trade. 7 This
claim is clearly unwarranted in the U.S./Latin American context. Several studies have shown that if a NAFTA-style Free
Trade Area of the Americas comes into existence, the United
States will obtain greater benefits than its Latin American counterparts will. "[I] t is highly doubtful that Latin American countries stand to gain much from entering into an arrangement
which gives their rich counterparts - the USA and Canada - a

much greater preferential market access than the latter are able
to offer in return. .

.

. Discriminatory liberalization with the

United States under these circumstances is unlikely to confer
major gains and will, very likely, lower welfare. ' 28 If Mexico's
experience with NAFTA is of any guide, the Latin American
countries are not likely to benefit from the FTAA, unless the
United States truly opens its large market to Latin American agricultural and industrial exports. In 1995, the Salinas miracle collapsed together with the Mexican peso crisis. As a result,
[e]mployment in manufacturing fell, the poorly paid informal sector of the economy grew, and assets became more
concentrated. Average wages for most of Mexico's industrial
workers dropped 10% since the early 1990s ....

[R]elative

social spending has declined since the late 1980s. The North
American Development Bank has yet to have a major impact
on cleaning up the U.S.-Mexican border....

Many Mexicans

29
have not yet supped at the table of free trade prosperity.

According to two World Bank experts, "[o]verall, full Free
Trade Agreement preferences would raise Latin American exports only 8 or 9[%] . . .U.S. trade gains, particularly for highly
protected transport and machinery products, are likely to be
considerably greater than those for Latin America are in the U.S.
market.""°
27. See Snidal, supra note 21, at 581.
28. Arvind Panagariya, The Free Trade Area of the Americas: Good for Latin America?,
WORLD ECON. 485, 504-05 (1996).
29. PoITRAs, supra note 5, at 125.
30. CARRANZA, OPEN REGIONALISM, supra note 20, at 154 (quoting REFIK ERZAN &
ALEXANDERJ. YEATS, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES: WHAT'S IN IT
FOR LATIN AMERICA (1992)).
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Opposition to the FTAA in Latin America is widespread, because it is perceived as a narrow, free-market oriented agreement, "a brainchild of big business, whose interests it would
serve from start to finish." 1 On the other hand, the United
States presents itself as a benevolent hegemon, attempting to debunk the myths of the FTAA as an instrument of U.S. predatory
hegemony. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has produced a series of fact sheets on the FTAA trying to prove that (a)
NAFTA has been a huge success for the United States and its
NAFTA partners,3 2 (b) far from spreading poverty, "free trade
and open markets are among the most powerful tools available
to fight poverty,"3 3 and (c) the FTAA would not provide excessive privileges to U.S. corporations, such as the right to sue gov34
ernments to overturn laws.
Despite the U.S. rhetoric on the benefits of free trade in the
Americas, after the Cancun debacle in September 2003 the
United States has deployed a coercive, rather than benevolent,
diplomacy. According to hegemonic stability theory,35 5 "when
power is distributed asymmetrically but hegemony is exercised in
ways that do not benefit all states, subordinate states will chafe
under the (coercive) leadership." 36 After Cancun, the United
States used its structural power, attempting to destroy the Group
of twenty-two developing nations that stood their ground in the
WTO negotiations. Economic threats and reprisals were delivered against the Latin American nations that had stood with Brazil at Cancun:
The impoverished island nations of the Caribbean were told
they could forget about their newly negotiated US trade
agreement. They folded. Central American countries were
threatened with loss of the modest trade preferences...

al-

ready granted to their products. Costa Rica.. .was hammered
31. William Finnegan, The Economics of Empire: Notes on the Washington Consensus,
HARPER'S MAGAZINE, May 2003, at 41, 49 (2003).
32. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Myth: NAFTA was a Failurefor the US., Fact Sheet (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov.
33. Id., Myth: Trade and the FTAA will Spread Poverty, Fact Sheet, (Nov. 2003), available at http:ustr.gov.
34. See id., Myth: FIAA Allows Corporationsto "Sue" Governments to Overturn Laws,
Fact Sheet, (Nov. 2003), available at http:ustr.gov.
35. See CARRANZA, OPEN REGIONALISM, supra note 20, at 153 (quoting Snidal, supra
note 21, at 579).
36. Snidal, supra note 21, at 582.
306
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- privatize your energy and telecommunications sectors or
be left in the cold - and gave in. Peru and Colombia both
resigned from Lula's group.... Within a few weeks, Lula's G22 coalition had shrunk to the -12. 3 7

Yet, these defections did not lead the smaller economies to
bandwagon with the United States in the FTAA negotiations, as
predicted by the Gruber thesis, which is discussed in detail in the
next section. Gruber explicitly makes the distinction between
"go-it-alone power" and coercive power. Unlike the latter, go-italone power does not require the winners to force their opponents into submission:
At no point does anyone in the power-politics model I put
forward coerce, or even attempt to coerce, anyone else. Nor,
for that matter, do the beneficiaries of cooperation engage in
'linkage politics.' The winners do not get the losers to acquiesce by compensating them (via side payments) in some
other sphere of interaction. The losers acquiesce because
they know that the winners are in a position to proceed without them.3 8
The post-Cancun U.S. offensive was meant to soften up Brazil for the Miami Trade Ministerial Conference in November
2003. Although the United States managed to weaken the
Southern coalition formed in Cancun, U.S. economic threats
were not enough to form a pro-NAFTA-style FTAA in Miami,
where the countries which abandoned the G-22 still supported
Brazil's proposal for a multi-speed FTAA (see below). Bargaining power, not go-it-alone power was at work in Miami. The
United States did not even offer meaningful side payments to
the smaller economies, such as redistributive mechanisms or
some type of compensation for the loss of trade taxes that would
result from the FTAA.
Go-it-alone power would have worked in the early 1990s,
when NAFTA extension was still a possible pathway to the FrAA,
and the Latin American countries still had strong defensive motivations to join an enlarged NAFTA, to avoid the costs of exclusion. However, between the Miami (1994) and Santiago (1998)
37. William Greider & Kenneth Rapoza, Lula Raises the Stakes, 277(18) THE NATION

12 (2003).
38. LLOYD

GRUBER, RULING THE WORLD:

NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

7-8 (2000).

POWER POLITICS AND THE RISE OF SUPRA-
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summits of the Americas, the United States was unable to convince the South American countries that a NAFTA-style FTAA
was in their best interests. Instead of a U.S.-dominated Western
hemisphere trading bloc, which would undermine sub-regional
cooperation, sub-regional trading blocs, particularly MERCOSUR, seemed to be trumping the possibility of a "Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area." For domestic political reasons (including strong domestic political opposition to NAFTA), the United
States was reluctant to move from a mere regionalist option to
strongly committing to a regionalist policy and thus "fail [ed] to
provide strong leadership or a clear vision in its policy on hemispheric regionalism."3 9
III. DEFENSIVE INCENTIVES TO "BANDWAGON" WITH THE
UNITED STATES
Lloyd Gruber has argued that regional collective action and
the emergence of supranational regional institutions can be explained by the logic of go-it-alone power:
[I]nstitutionalized cooperation by one group of actors (the
winners) can have the effect of restricting the options available to another group of actors (the losers), altering the rules
of the game such that members of the latter group are better
off playing by the new rules despite their strong preference
for the original, pre-cooperation status-quo. 4 °

If Gruber is correct, all the Latin American countries will
end up jumping on the bandwagon of the hemispheric hegemonic power for fear of being excluded from a hemispheric accord that grants preferential access to the U.S. market, one of
the largest markets in the world. According to Gruber, the losers
are forced to accept the institutional arrangements (including
supranational institutions) proposed by the "enacting coalition"
because they have no alternative:
[T] he winners' actions have had the effect of removing the

status quo from their choice sets, leaving them with what they
view as a bad option (cooperating with the winners) and an
even worse alternative (incurring the costs of exclusion).4 1
39. Louis Belanger, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Regionalist Option in the Americas, in
supra note 9, at 95.
40. GRUBER, supra note 38, at 7.
41. Id. at 8.

AMERICAS IN TRANSITION,

1042

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 27:1029

In the early 199 0s, the extension of NAFTA, and NAFIA-plus
scenarios were based on this framework. For example, Roberto
Bouzas and others argued that after NAFTA, defensive incentives
would lead the Latin American countries to eagerly seek either
NAFTA membership or bilateral free trade agreements with the
United States, "to avoid the costs of exclusion."4 2 The assumption was that a rule-constrained hegemonic order under U.S. leadership left the Latin American countries with no choice but to accept the rules of the game imposed by the United States in exchange for vague promises for access to the U.S. market. From
this perspective, a free trade regime in the Americas would come
into existence through the progressive extension of NAFTA
(Gruber's "enacting coalition") to Central America, the Caribbean, and South America, beginning with Chile. For these countries, outright opposition to NAFTA's "rules of the game" would
be "dangerous and costly."4
Similarly, Andrew Hurrell compared the "far stronger
states" of the Asia Pacific region to the "weaker" South American
states. He argued that the "balance of incentives" would force
the latter to accept the "major U.S. objectives" in exchange for
"more secure access to the crucial U.S. market" hoping that
"high levels of institutionalization" would eventually "restrict
' '4 4
their vulnerability to the unilateral exercise of U.S. power.
If the Gruber/Bouzas thesis is correct, bandwagoning with
the United States is inevitable and eventually MERCOSUR and
the other sub-regional trading blocs in the Western hemisphere
will dance to the tune of the U.S. vision of hemispheric regionalism. However, the history of the FTAA negotiations after the
Miami (1994) and Santiago (1998) summits of the Americas has
not followed the logic of go-it-alone power. Only Mexico was prepared to pay the high entry fees required by the United States to
accept a Latin American country as a reliable trading partner.
NAFTA standards assumed many conditions that were unique to
42. See Roberto Bouzas, Preferential Trade Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere:
NAFTA and Beyond, in REGIONALISM AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY THE CASE OF LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 144 (Jan Teunissen ed., 1995).
43. Andrew Hurrell, Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective, in REGIONALISM IN WORLD
POLITICS: REGIONAL ORGANIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 51 (Louise Fawcett &
Andrew Hurrell eds., 1995). See GRUBER, supra note 38 (providing sophisticated theoretical basis of forecast); Bouzas, supra note 42.
44. Hurrell, supra note 43, at 51.
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Mexico. Bouzas argues that whether other countries would be
ready to pay high "entry fees" will vary "according to the size of
the costs of exclusion for those left out of an expanding
NAFTA."4 5 The costs of exclusion were high for the Central
American and Caribbean countries but rather low for the
MERCOSUR countries. Argentina toyed for a while with the
possibility of joining NAFTA to attract foreign investments but
Brazil was deeply concerned about the high short-term costs of
entering NAFTA.
Once the FTAA negotiations were launched in 1998, Brazil
pressed for a slower pace in negotiations fearing that its local
industries would be unable to compete with the more competitive U.S. industries. For Brazil, the FTAA is not a foregone conclusion; it will sign the agreement only if the United States
makes a serious commitment to open its domestic market to Brazil's manufactured products. Contrary to what one would expect
using Gruber's model, the simplest way of explaining Brazil's foreign economic policy and strategy during the FTAA negotiations
is that Brazil uses MERCOSUR to balance U.S. power in the
Western Hemisphere, "by forging a single South American negotiating bloc capable of standing up to the United States, and by
courting other trading partners [such as the European Union]
to reduce dependence on the United States."46 Brazil's strongly
autonomous foreign policy and its aspirations to a greater international role challenge Gruber's claim that "as pressures on outsiders continue to mount," more and more countries will be
forced to jump on to the U.S.-led bandwagon of free trade in the
Western hemisphere.
Next, the logic of go-it-alonepower does not help explain the
emergence and resilience of MERCOSUR as an independent,
thriving trading bloc in the 1990s, despite the structural power
asymmetry between the United States and the Southern Cone
countries.
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet
Union favored regionalist arrangements as long as they "reinforced the strength of their respective alliance systems or pro-

45. Bouzas, supra note 42, at 145.
46. Christopher M. Bruner, Hemispheric Integration and the Politics of Regionalism:
The Free Trade Area of the Americas, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1, 29 (2002).
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vided support for important clients. ' 4 7 The United States rhetorically supported the Latin American Free Trade Area
("LA-FTA") created by the Treaty of Montevideo in 1960.48 However, the World Bank and its subsidiaries ignored LAFTA's existence in their lending activities and the International Monetary
Fund openly opposed the creation of regional payment mechanisms. 4 9 MERCOSUR has been openly opposed by the United
States and the international agencies controlled by the U.S. government.5 ° The United States failed to prevent MERCOSUR
from becoming an imperfect customs union in January 1995.
The United States' attempts to disarm MERCOSUR in stages in
the name of Western hemisphere trade liberalization have been
hindered by the United States' failure to support Argentina during the severe economic crisis of 2001-2002. U.S. indifference to
the Argentine crisis created incentives for the MERCOSUR
countries to cling together and seriously damaged the model of
a NAFTA-centered FTAA promoted by Washington.
Neo-realists claim that States that feel threatened by U.S. benign hegemonic pretensions will inevitably form a coalition (or
even an alliance) in order to balance U.S. power.5" The Argentine and Brazilian governments describe MERCOSUR as a "strategic alliance" and MERCOSUR has become "extremely important to Brazil's overall economic and foreign policy goals. 5 2 After the South American presidential summit in Brasilia, in
August 2000, the countries in the region are increasingly committed to developing a specifically South American international
policy, reducing reliance on the United States and expanding
47. Hurrell, supra note 43, at 49.
48. At the summit conference of Western Hemisphere presidents in Punta del
Este, Uruguay, in April 1967, U.S. President Johnson formally endorsed the commitment of the Latin American countries to turn all of Latin America into a common
market by no later than 1985.
49. See Miguel Wionczek, The Latin American Free Trade Association: Toward Economic Cooperation, in INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMUNITIES: AN ANTHOLOcY 322-23
(1966).
50. "First attacked in 1991 for its credibility and internal cohesion, MERCOSUR
was subsequently depicted as a threat to hemispheric regionalism." Ivan Bernier & Martin Roy, NAFTA and MERCOSUR Two Competing Models?, in AMERICAS IN TRANSITION,
supra note 9, at 69.
51. See Christopher Layne, The UnipolarIllusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise, 17
INT'L SECURITY 11-12, 34 (1993).
52. Andrew Hurrell, The Politics of Regional Integration in MERCOSUR, in REGIONAL
INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:
REGIONALISM

210 (Victor Bulmer-Thomas ed., 2001).
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their external contacts. Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da
Silva is leading this effort, arguing that merging South America's
two largest trading blocs (MERCOSUR and the Andean Community) will force the United States to grant concessions in the final
round of the FTAA negotiations.53 .
IV. THE FFAA NEGOTIATIONS AS A TWO-LEVEL GAME AND
THE US.-BRAZIL STRATEGIC GAME
As Feinberg notes, U.S. trade policy "does not arise from
some unitary 'national interest' embodied in the presidency but
rather boils up from the many strands of domestic politics. And
U.S. society is deeply divided on trade policy, especially with regard to developing countries. '54 Domestic political constraints
will significantly affect the outcome of the FTAA negotiations:
The choices of U.S. trade negotiators are greatly affected by
the demands of a number of domestic constituencies, including labor, environmental, and business groups, all of which in
turn impact the more general perceptions of the American
public, leaving the USTR with a complex and often contradictory set of marching orders. Brazil, for its part, encounters
significant constraints in the form of intra-MERCOSUR and
South American relations, which must be carefully managed
if Brazil is to achieve its goal of exerting greater leverage
5
through bloc negotiation of the FTAA.
An FTAA will dramatically affect domestic politics in individual countries, which helps explain the Brazilian tough negotiating position at the Miami talks (quietly supported by much of
the rest of Latin America) and the opposition to the FTAA on
the part of several U.S. business organizations and the AFLCIO.5 6 In the end, the fate of the FTAA may be decided in the
corridors of the U.S. Congress, in the White House, and in the
presidential palace (the Planalto) in Brasilia, rather than in the
nine negotiating groups or in the trade ministerial conferences.
53. See Kim Housego, Brazil Pushes S. American Trade Links, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESSJune 29, 2003.
54. Richard E. Feinberg, Regionalism and Domestic Politics: US-Latin American Trade
Policy in the Bush Era, 44 LATIN AM. POL & Soc'v 127, 129 (2002).
55. Bruner, supra note 46, at 64.
56. See AFL-CIO Executive Council, Free Trade Area of the Americas Ministerial in
Miami: An Action Plan to Oppose the FTAA, available at http://www.aflcio.org/
aboutaflcio/ecouncil/ec02272003k.cfm (2003).
NEWS,
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From this perspective, the FTAA negotiations can be analyzed as a two-level bargaining game.5 7 "Level I bargaining" at
the summits of the Americas and trade ministerial conferences
has attracted the attention of the official media in the thirty-four
participating countries. Yet the FTAA will be ultimately decided
at "Level II bargaining," involving parallel discussions among domestic constituents over the pros and cons of the final text submitted for ratification by the national legislatures.
The Level II bargaining game is as important in individual
Latin American countries as it is in the United States. The FTAA
has been thoroughly discussed in the Brazilian Congress and
press. The Cardoso administration organized a referendum on
the FTAA which confirmed the existence of strong domestic political opposition to the FTAA in Brazil. A similar popular consultation has been organized in Argentina by one hundred nongovernmental organizations. Even if the Bush administration
manages to organize a Level-II win-set (quashing domestic opposition to the FTAA in the United States), domestic skepticism in
several Latin American countries, energized by the socio-political backlash against globalization in the region, could still derail
the FIAA. On the other hand, the negotiating position of individual countries, especially the smaller ones, has been strengthened by the fact that they can negotiate as members of a subregional grouping.5"
The FTAA talks are about more than eliminating tariff barriers (market access) and involve several sensitive issues such as
services, investment, government procurement, and intellectual
property rights that have the potential to compromise Brazil's
industrial policy and autonomous development strategy. Hence
President Lula's claim that it does not make sense "to concede
preferential access to [Brazil's] markets without receiving in re57. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427-60 (1988).
58. For example, the fifteen-member Caribbean Community had a lead negotiator, Richard Bernal, at the Eighth Trade Ministerial Meeting in Miami, November 20,
2003. Similarly, the MERCOSUR and Andean Community countries have each
adopted a posture as a bloc in the final round of the FTAA talks. At the Trade Ministerial Meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica, March 19, 1998, it was decided that countries can
negotiate as members of a sub-regional trading bloc, thus legitimizing MERCOSUR's
stance in the negotiations and forcing the United States to make important concessions
on the format for the FTAA talks, such as the "single undertaking" principle and the
creation of a negotiating group for agriculture.
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turn concessions in areas in which [Brazil] is more competitive,
such as agriculture ....

The U.S. strategy of isolating Brazil (and MERCOSUR) by
negotiating bilateral free trade areas with individual Latin American countries may backfire because Brazil is also negotiating
free trade agreements with some of the same countries. Despite
having signed a free trade agreement with the United States,
Chile has restarted talks to join MERCOSUR, something that will
weaken the bargaining power of the United States in the final
round of the FTAA negotiations. All the countries participating
in the FTAA talks have their own independent trade strategy,
which has resulted in a tapestry of bilateral and sub-regional free
trade agreements, i.e., countries integrating with each other
around the United States, not with the United States. This split
dynamic was recognized and legitimized at the Eighth Trade Ministerial Meeting held in Miami, on November 20-21, 2003. The
"Miami Declaration" (or the "Declaration") establishes a multiple speed FTAA, allowing individual countries to "conduct plurilateral negotiations within the FTAA," defining additional obligations and benefits in several issue areas.
As originally conceived, hemispheric regionalism was a strategy on the part of the Clinton administration, supported by "internationalist" business interests, "to 'lock in' a political economy ideologically and strategically hospitable to the rules of the
neo-liberal game."60 For example, the five-hundred U.S. companies with the closest links to Latin America are pushing for fast
implementation of a NAFTA-style FTAA incorporating all the
tradedisciplines of the deep integrationagenda.6 1 Yet implementing
the Washington Consensus undermined democracy in Latin
America and laid the basis for the backlash against globalization
in the 1990s.
The turning point was the implosion of the Argentine economy in December 2001 and the callous indifference of the
United States to Argentina's plight in 2001-2002, which led Ar59. Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Speech at the Inaugural Parliamentary Meeting to
Discuss the FTAA and the Role of the Legislators in the FTAA (Oct. 29, 2003), available
at http://www.brazil.org.uk/page.php?cid=1764.
60. Nicola Phillips, Hemispheric Integration and Subregionalism in the Americas, 79
INT'L ASF. 327, 330 (2003).
61. See Claudio Katz, Free Trade Area of the Americas: NAFTA Marches South, in
NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 27-28, 34 (2002).
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gentina to strengthen its strategic alliance with Brazil, while seeking support from the rest of Latin America, the European
Union, Japan, and China. U.S. policy toward Argentina showed
the shaky foundations for establishing a new partnership between the United States and Latin America, based on the "Western Hemisphere Idea." The absence of U.S. leadership during
the Argentine crisis bodes very poorly for building a long-term,
mature relationship between the United States and Latin
America, based on mutuality of interests. In the words of Peter
Hakim, President of Inter-American Dialogue, "[i]f this is what
community means, it doesn't mean much."6 2

V. FROM COOPERATION TO DISILLUSIONMENT: U.S.-LATIN
AMERICAN RELATIONS BEFORE AND AFTER
SEPTEMBER 11 TH
After assuming office in January 2001, President Bush emphasized his interest in strengthening ties with Latin America
and his first official presidential trip was to visit Mexican President Vicente Fox at his ranch in Guanajuato. However, after the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States,
Latin America returned to its normal status of third order priority in U.S. foreign policy.6 3 This occurred despite the fact that
the failure of neo-liberal economic policies was producing increasing resentment against U.S./IMF-sponsored economic adjustment programs and the popular backlash against globalization which had already overthrown four presidents: Jamal
Mahuad in Ecuador (2000), Alberto Fujimori in Peru (2000),
Fernando De La Rua in Argentina (2001), and Gonzalo Sanchez
de Lozada in Bolivia (2003).

64

62. Larry Rohter, A Fiscal Crisis, Paid in Credibility: Consequencesfor the United States
in Argentina's Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2001, at A9.
63. Latin America has always been neglected in the "grand strategies" of the
United States. During the Cold 'War, the United States paid attention to the region
only in times of crisis and only when it perceived its security interests to be threatened,
such as during the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis or the 1965 U.S. military intervention in Santo Domingo. The rest of the time, the United States ignored the region:
most policy makers believe that the security of the United States would not be
adversely affected if Latin America were, say, to sink to the bottom of the
sea ....
[Ilt is not that policy makers want much of anything from Latin
America but rather that they do not want the Soviet Union to have it.
LAIRS SCHOULTZ, NATIONAL SECURITY AND UNITED STATES POLIcY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA

310 (1987).
64. See Anibal S. Perez Linan, Argentina y el Nuevo Patron de InestabilidadPolitica en
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Most people in the region feel that two decades of neoliberal economic policies have done little to alleviate poverty in
Latin America. Several U.S. analysts noted that by ignoring the
Latin American economic and social predicament, the United
States was "losing Latin America. '6 ' As a result, the strong Latin
American solidarity with the United States after the September
l1th tragedy slowly vanished. These sentiments turned into resentment and animosity, especially after the U.S. decision to invade Iraq, which was widely perceived in Latin America as a neocolonial enterprise. This decision was not supported by the
Latin American non-permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council, Mexico and Chile, despite their close economic ties with the United States.
The Summit of the Americas Process and the FTAA negotiations, launched at the Second Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile, 1998, were originally perceived in Latin America as
marking the beginning of a new era in U.S.- Latin American relations. Despite structural asymmetries between the United States
and Latin America, the two sides would embark on a mature relationship and the United States would be willing and able to
deliver sufficient concessions in the FTAA talks to compensate
the concessions it wanted from Latin America. However, the inability of the Clinton administration to obtain fast-track negotiating authority from the U.S. Congress raised serious doubts during and after the Santiago summit about the seriousness of the
U.S. commitment to the FTAA.
In October 2002, the U.S. Congress finally granted fast-track
authority (renamed Trade Promotion Authority, "TPA") to President Bush, but it imposed severe limitations on his power to
sign free trade agreements without amendments from Congress.6 6 Since the last stage of the FTAA talks coincides with the
America Latina, 1 REVISTA DE LA SOCIEDAD ARGENTINA DE ANALISIS POLITICO 167-85
(2002).
65. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Losing Latin America, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2002, at A27;
Enrique Rangel, Latin Americans Shout They're Fed Up - but is U.S. Listening?, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 26, 2003; Nicholas D. Kristof, The Next Africa? South
America Sinks Into Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2002, at A31; Edward N. Luttwak, U.S. is
Ignoring the Dire Straits of Latin American Countries, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEws, May 26,
2002, at 3G; Nicholas Kristof, If Saddam Were Only Brazilian, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, at
A35.
66. For a list of "sensitive" agricultural products, for example, the TPA law imposes
several conditions that must be met before including them in trade negotiations.
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2004 election year, the Bush administration is unlikely to make
concessions on issues such as agricultural subsidies, which have
strong domestic constituencies in states like Florida (which are
crucial battlegrounds in President Bush's drive for reelection).
These domestic political constraints have made it difficult to
achieve a comprehensive FTAA treaty in January 2005. On one
hand, Brazil has consistently refused to accept the U.S. position
of excluding farm subsidies from the FTAA negotiations, leaving
them for the Doha Round of global trade talks (which have
stalled). On the other hand, as Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso
Amorim recognized at the Miami Trade ministerial meeting in
November 2003, trying to push the United States to discuss U.S.
agricultural subsidies in the FTAA talks is like "believing in fairy
tales. "67
The history of the FTAA negotiations challenges former
U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefky's claim that the
United States, will always be at the center just because of the
structural weight of its US$ ten trillion economy. In the mid1990s it was widely believed that the Latin American countries
had no alternative to moving in the direction of the FTAA. This
interpretation underestimated the potential of sub-regional
blocs such as MERCOSUR to challenge U.S. hegemony.
The United States managed to include the deep integration
agenda of a NAFTA-style FTAA in the nine negotiating groups
which began their work after the Santiago Summit in 1998.
These groups, however, have not made much progress in dealing with contentious issues, such as trade in services, agriculture,
government procurement, intellectual property, or antidumping. A cursory review of the third draft of the FTAA treaty shows
that most of the draft treaty remains in brackets.6 8 This enhances bloc bargaining, i.e., balancing U.S. power, rather than
bandwagoning on the U.S. vision for the FTAA. Bolstering the
sub-regional groupings (MERCOSUR, Andean Community,
CARICOM and CACM) has been a strategy for survival against
absorptioninto an FTAA that would not recognize the needs and
sensitivities of the different sub-regions and the tremendous ad67. John Pain, Negotiators in Miami Adopt Draft Creating Trade Zone in Americas, CRATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PREss, Nov. 20, 2003, at C6.

68. See FTAA - Free Trade Area of the Americas, Third Draft Agreement, Nov.
21, 2003, FTAA.TNC/w/133.REV.3 (not yet entered into force), available at http://
www.ftaa-alca.org/FTAADraft03/Index-e.asp.
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justment problems for individual countries, especially
smaller economies of Central America and the Caribbean.

the

VI. THE MIAMI TRADE MINISTERIAL: REASSERTED U.S.
HEGEMONY OR U.S. HEGEMONY IN DECLINE?
A. From Quito to Miami: the Cancun Debacle
The FTAA talks began in earnest after the Seventh Trade
Ministerial Meeting, held in Quito on November 1, 2002. The
thirty-four trade ministers reiterated their commitment to initiate market access negotiations in early 2003, to continue progress in eliminating brackets from the draft text of the FTAA,
and to define the institutional aspects of the agreement. In February 2003, the participating countries began to exchange their
offers for market access negotiations. The U.S. offer granted different rates of reductions in trade barriers throughout the region, providing for better access to the U.S. market for the
smaller and poorer economies, than to MERCOSUR. Brazil and
Argentina argued that they were unfairly penalized by this approach.
In Quito, the biggest sticking point was agriculture. The
United States insisted that in the FTAA, it would talk only about
greater market access, leaving the highly controversial issue of
U.S. agricultural subsidies for the Doha round of global trade
talks. At the July 2003 meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee (the "TNC") in El Salvador, MERCOSUR made a proposal to negotiate the issues so far discussed in five of the nine
negotiating groups in three tracks, excluding from the FTAA talks
the issues that matter most for the United States - trade in
services, government procurement, and rules to protect intellectual property and foreign investment. It soon became apparent
that unless the United States and Brazil made major concessions
at the Eighth Trade Ministerial Meeting in Miami (November
16-21, 2003), the FTAA talks could end up in failure; or at best
result in an FTAA-light, which would exclude: (1) agricultural
subsidies and anti-dumping duties (two areas in which the
United States adamantly refuses to make concessions) and (2)
all the sensitive issues (trade in services, government procurement, etc.) of the deep integration agenda promoted by the
United States. Such issues are unlikely to be settled in the
WTO/Doha Round of global trade talks.
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The breakdown of negotiations at the trade ministerial
meeting of the WTO in Cancun, in September 2003 was due to
the resistance of the Group of twenty-two developing countries,
or G-22, led by India, China, and Brazil, to make concessions on
the Singaporeissues. The Singapore issues were a set of new issues,
including rules on foreign investment and competition policy,
that have little to do with trade and "would make it more difficult for developing countries to make foreign investment work
for their own benefit."6 9 These rules "could forbid countries
from requiring that foreign firms transfer technology or hire local skilled workers or managers ' 70 and would establish brand
new rights for U.S. and European multinational corporations
overseas, including the so-called "investor-state" provision contained in NAFTA, "which grants to corporations a legal status
similar to that of states and expands their ability to 71use trade
agreements to challenge local regulatory legislation.
MERCOSUR has consistently rejected the Singapore issues
throughout the FTAA talks. On the other hand, MERCOSUR
and the Andean Community have made significant progress in
the negotiations to achieve a free trade agreement ("FTA") between both blocs. If such an agreement comes into existence,
Brazil and MERCOSUR will have a meaningful alternative to the
FTAA: a South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA) and a SouthSouth scenario, including negotiations with India, South Africa,
South Korea, and China, while pursuing a free trade area with
the European Union.
A South-South scenario has become more likely after the
Eighth Trade Ministerial Conference in Miami, which adopted a
vague buffet-style commitment to free trade a la carte, thus renouncing to achieve the kind of comprehensive, deep integration
agreement promoted by the United States. In this scenario, only
an FTAA-light will come into existence, without binding commitments in the controversial areas of trade in services, government
procurement, etc. (long sought by the United States) or agricultural subsidies and anti-dumping duties (long sought by Brazil
and the rest of Latin America).
69. Mark Weisbrot, WTO Beached in Cancun, Center for Economic and Policy Research, available at http://wwwcepr.net/columns/weisbrot/WTO_Cancun.htm (Sept.
16, 2003).
70. Id.
71. Phillips, supra note 60, at 334.
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Although the United States and Brazil managed to avoid a
Cancun-style collapse at the Miami talks, they failed to bridge the
gap between their negotiating positions. The United States refused to consider reducing its farm subsidies as part of the FTAA
and Brazil refused to accept the comprehensive NAFTA-like
agreement sought by the United States. The outcome of the
Miami meeting shows that there is nothing inevitable about the
FTAA, because individual countries want different things from
free trade in the Americas.
The inevitability assumption about the FTAA starts from the
premise that all the Latin American countries are eager to obtain what Mexico gained through NAFTA: attracting foreign investment, unrestricted access to the U.S. market, and a certificate of credibility for their market-oriented policy reforms.
From this perspective, it would have made sense for the Latin
American trade representatives to make concessions to the
United States in Miami in the areas of investment, competition,
services, and intellectual property rights, without a reciprocal
commitment on the part of the United States to eliminate its
non-tariff barriers to Latin American exports at a certain date.
This would leave the settlement of the latter issue to the stalled
Doha Round of global trade talks. However, the lesson of Mexican President Salinas's strategy in the NAFTA negotiations is
that without a genuine initial balance of reciprocal concessions
the final product of the negotiations ends up disproportionately
benefiting the United States. In the new domestic political context, created by the backlash against globalization in Latin
America, the "investment and growth" 2 logic for bandwagoning
with a NAFTA-style FTAA does not solve the immediate challenges
faced by the new reformist ruling elites in the region. It also
72. See Jose M. Salazar-Xirinachs, The Politics and Future of Hemispheric Free
Trade, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/tunit/staff%5Farticle/jmsx3%5Fyale.asp
(Apr. 2-4, 2003). Salazar-Xirinachs has argued that instead of "insisting on a genuine
mercantilist balance of reciprocal concessions" in the final round of the FTAA talks,
Latin American trade negotiators should
internalize to some extent the political economy restrictions of the United
States and give more weight to an investment and growth logic according to
which even if the mercantilist balance of concessions is not attractive enough,
other growth, investment and policy signaling effects incline the balance in
favor of signing up to a less liberalizing, or less ambitious, FTAA.
Id. He does recognize, however, that this option is more attractive for the smaller economies than for Brazil and the larger economies. Id.
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suspiciously sounds like "more of the same" to an impoverished
and angry Latin American population that perceives the FTAA
as a plan designed by the United States and big business to
deepen the neo-liberal reforms which are blamed for the social,
economic and political crises of the 1990s.
B. The Miami Declaration
On Thursday, November 20, 2003, the trade ministers from
the thirty-four participating countries approved the Miami Declaration, ending the Eighth Ministerial Meeting one day earlier.
The early end allowed the trade ministers to avoid a collapse
similar to the one at the WTO talks in Cancun in September
2003. The trade ministers agreed on a framework to continue
the negotiations, " [b] ut it's a vague plan that caters to the lowest
common denominator."7 3 Most importantly, the new framework
supersedes the single undertaking principle that had guided the
negotiations since the San Jose Declaration and Santiago Summit in 1998.
The Miami Declaration contemplates a more flexible, but
also diluted, FTAA. The idea of a broad-based FTAA is preserved and the nine negotiating groups are instructed to make
progress in their respective areas. The parties will attempt to
develop a common and balanced set of rights and obligations
applicable to each country. However, the declaration gives
countries the right not to take on all the obligations in any one
of the nine areas of negotiations, thus establishing a multi-speed
FTAA in which "interested parties may choose to develop additional liberalization and disciplines," 4 on a bilateral or plurilateral basis.
In Miami, the United States attempted to pressure Brazil to
play by its rules. The United States announced on the second
day of the Trade Ministerial Conference that, in addition to
ongoing free trade talks with Central American countries, it also
intends to pursue free trade agreements with six Latin American
Nations, including Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Panama, and Peru.
73. Free Trade, a la Carte, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2003, at A28.
74. See Free Trade Area of the Americas, Eighth Trade Ministerial Meeting, Declaration of Ministers, Miami, Florida Nov. 20, 2003, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/
Ministerials/Miami/Miamie.asp [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration of Miami].
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The Miami Declaration reflects a draw between NAFTA and
MERCOSUR. On the one hand, the Declaration can be interpreted as a victory for MERCOSUR. According to paragraph 7,
"[in] inisters recognize that countries may assume different levels
of commitments, '7 that is countries do not have to accept
NAFTA-style trade disciplines if they do not wish to. On the
other hand, after the Cancun debacle, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick announced that "America will not wait for
the won't-do countries [and would] move towards free trade
with can-do countries. '76 From this perspective, the Miami Declaration is a victory for the United States because the Declaration
legitimizes the U.S. strategy of striking bilateral free trade agreements with individual countries.
The U.S. strategy in Miami resembles the hub-and-spokes
model for NAFTA extension in the early 1990s. However, U.S.Latin American relations have changed since 1992, when Mexico
negotiated NAFTA with the United States.
Nowadays,
bandwagoning with the United States is not the only alternative
for the rest of Latin America; countries can choose alternative
courses of action. For example, according to Argentina's trade
representative, Martin Redrado, "Argentina is not interested in a
bilateral agreement with the United States.

.

. [because] Brazil is

[Argentina's] strategic partner; this is [Argentina's] official government policy and priority." 77 "Mr. Redrado also emphasized
that Argentina's trade policy does not exclude any scenario, and
'FTAA is one of those scenarios.'"78 However, President Kirchner of Argentina promised "'a great national debate on the
FTAA' to decide 'on which areas we should advance', depending
on Argentina's and MERCOSUR's interests."7 9 Though this is
similar to the Brazilian position, Brazil has always emphasized
the need for balancing the United States in the FTAA talks, instead of bandwagoning with the U.S. proposals.
MERCOSUR's strategy of balancing U.S. structural power in
75. See id. at 2.
76. Robert B. Zoellick, America Will Not Wait for the Won't-do Countries, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 2003, at 23.
77. See Consensus in Miami Surprises Demonstrators, in MERCOPRESS: FALKLANDMALVINAS & SOUTH ATLANTIC NEWS, available at http://www.mercopress.com/Detalle.asp?
NUM=2893 [hereinafter MERCOPRESS].
78. Id.
79. Id.
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the FTAA talks while leaving the door ajar for jumping on the
U.S.- led bandwagon of unrestricted free trade in the Americas
runs the risk of playing with fire. In the absence of a good alternative (such as a consolidated MERCOSUR, with a common currency and supranational institutions) bandwagoning with a diluted NAFTA-like FTAA may end up being the only attractive
option for Argentina and Brazil, if this alternative provides for
the elimination of at least some important non-tariff barriers
(e.g., U.S. anti-dumping legislation) for access to the U.S. market.
The nature of U.S. hegemony in the era of globalization is a
hotly-debated scholarly topic. This issue is sometimes conflated
with the question of whether the United States is in the process
of establishing an "informal global empire," backed up by its unchallenged global military superiority. However, the term hegemony is better than empire in analyzing U.S. leadership in the contemporary world, especially in the new global political economy.8 o The term empire is closely associated with control on the
part of an imperial State of the territory and populations formerly controlled by subservient states. The United States runs a
military empire of 752 military bases located in more than 130
countries, and an erosion of national sovereignty clearly exists in
certain areas of economic policy-making. However, we still live
in an "unconquerable world"8 of sovereign Nation-States formally controlling their own territory and populations. Whether
or not the United States is in the process of establishing an informal or virtual empire, it undoubtedly has a considerable amount
of structural power in the areas of production, finance, knowledge, and security.8 2
VII. IS THERE LIFE FOR THE FTAA AFTER MIAMI?
At the Third Summit of the Americas in Quebec, President
Bush reaffirmed the formal commitment of the United States to
80. Bruce Cumings, Is America an Imperial Power?, 102
(2003).
81. See JONATHAN SCHELL, THE UNCONQUERABLE WORLD:

CURRENT HIsT.

355-60

POWER, NONVIOLENCE,

AND THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2003).

82. See SUSAN STRANGE, STATES AND MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY 24-27 (1988). See also Susan Strange, The Future of the American Empire, 42J. INT'L AFF. 1, 1-17 (1988); Martin Walker, America's Virtual Empire, 19 WORLD
PoL'YJ. 13, 13-20 (2002).
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achieving a Free Trade Area of the Americas in 2005. However,
the lack of progress in the nine negotiating groups between
2001 and 2003, to reach the genuine balance of reciprocal concessions demanded by Brazil shows that the United States is not
seriously committed to a fair FTAA, instead hoping that in the
end it would be able to isolate Brazil by negotiating bilateral
trade deals with Brazil's neighbors. The United States' apparent
strategy is to lure Brazil's neighbors away from MERCOSUR by
convincing them that gaining limited access to the U.S. market,
and a seal of approvalof neo-liberal economic policies in order to
attract foreign investment are good reasons for signing a free
trade agreement with the United States, even in the absence of
major U.S. concessions on U.S. non-tariff barriers to trade, such
as agricultural subsidies. According to Mark Fried, Communications and Advocacy Coordinator for Oxfam International, "[i]f
the United States is not going to deal with ...[agricultural subsidies] in the FTAA, it's not going to deal with it in the bilaterals."'8 3

The apparent divide and conquer strategy used by the United
States may not work and could even backfire, considering that
Brazil is also negotiating a free trade agreement between
MERCOSUR and the Andean Community that might be more
attractive for Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia than the
Bush administration's offers in bilateral negotiations. In fact,
most Latin American countries supported the Brazilian position
at the Trade Ministerial Meeting in Miami in November 2003,
despite the efforts made by Canada, Chile, and Mexico to place
the more ambitious NAFTA-style, FTAA talks back on track.
The lesson of Miami and the diplomatic maneuvering before
the conference is that the United States can exercise its structural power more effectively at the bilateral level, rather than at
the multilateral level of trade negotiations. Despite the asymmetric distribution of power in the Western hemisphere, Brazil's
economy is the largest Latin American economy (the eighth
largest in the world) and it does not make sense to talk about an
FTAA that excludes 36% of the economy of Latin America and
the Caribbean. However, the U.S. strategy before the Miami
Trade Ministerial Meeting was to isolate Brazil,
83. Jenalia Moreno, FFAA Trade Meeting: U.S. adds 6 players to Lean on Brazil; S.
American Giant Puts Up Resistance, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 19, 2003, at 1B, 10B.
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[a]nd when Lula didn't seem to get the message, Zoellick's
deputy, Peter Allgeier, announced that the United States intend[ed] to go ahead on FTAA without him. The new agreement would include all of North and South America-every
country but Brazil. Argentina, however, stood firm with Lula
and turned down a backdoor trade offer.8 4

Part of the ambiguity surrounding the issue of U.S. hegemony in Latin America stems from the use of different definitions
of international hegemony in contemporary literature. Realist
scholars tend to equate hegemony with military power. For example, William Wohlforth argues that the gap between U.S. military capabilities and its potential competitors is so wide that
there is no danger of "hegemonic rivalry" (hegemonic wars) and
"[t] he only options available to second-tier states [such as Brazil]
are to bandwagon with the polar power [the United States] ...
or at least to take no action that could incur its focused enmity. '"85 A better definition of hegemony is the one provided by
Antonio Gramsci, which combines the concepts of coercion
(military force) and consent (ideological leadership) as in the
often quoted equation: "State = political society + civil society, in
other words hegemony protected by the armor of coercion."86
For Gramsci, hegemony cannot be based only on sheer force.
If one applies Gramsci's definition of hegemony to United
States-Latin American relations, it becomes clear that the Bush
administration has failed to exercise ideological leadership in
the FTAA negotiations. During Bush's administration, there has
been a structural shift in the balance between force and consent
in the exercise of U.S. hegemony. The Bush administration has
a tendency to use force without (or with very little) consent, as in
the case of the U.S.' invasion of Iraq, which was strongly opposed
in Europe and Latin America.8 7 Robert Zoellick's strong-arms
trade strategy after the Cancun debacle fits nicely in George W.
Bush's go-it-alone foreign policy which is unwittingly encouraging
the emergence of anti-U.S. coalitions, such as the group of
84. Greider & Rapoza, supra note 37, at 12.
85. William C. Wohlforth, The Stability of a UnipolarWorld, 24 INr'L SECURITY 5, 25
(1999).
86. See ANTONIO GRAMsci, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO
GRAMSCi 263 (Quinton Hoare & Geoffrey Smith trans. & eds., 1971).
87. For an excellent analysis of the "Bush revolution" in U.S. foreign policy, see Ivo
H. Daalder & James M. Lindsay, Bush's Revolution, 102 CURRENT HIST. 367, 367-76
(2003).
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twenty-two developing nations at Cancun ("G-22") that seek to

redefine the rules of the game of globalization.
Even if one uses a realist, narrow definition of hegemony as

"the power of one state to enforce its will over others,""8 the

Miami Trade Ministerial Meeting shows that U.S. hegemony in
Latin America is declining. Brazil, supported by most Latin
American trade ministers, managed to block the U.S. attempt to

have its way on the deep integration agenda without making concessions regarding agricultural subsidies.8 9 On the other hand,
an FTAA a la carte gives the United States enough room to exercise its considerable structural power over smaller Latin Ameri-

can countries, such as Panama and the Dominican Republic.9 °
The NAFTA negotiations in 1991 through 1993 illustrate
the use of U.S. structural power in trade negotiations. The
United States was able to extract enormous concessions from

Mexico by taking advantage of the tremendous asymmetry of
power between the two countries (the U.S. gross domestic prod88. This is the standard realist definition of hegemony, using Max Weber's concept of power as "power over." See STEPHEN GILL, POWER AND RESISTANCE IN THE NEW
WORLD ORDER 74 (2003).
89. The outcome of the Miami trade ministerial was almost a foregone conclusion
after an understanding, ten days before the official conference between U.S. Trade
Representative Robert Zoellick and Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim to promote a variable-speed ("flexible") FTAA. See US-Brazil Anticipate Miami Success, in
MERCOPRESS, supra note 77, available at http://www.mercopress.com/Detalle.asp?NUM=
2889.
90. The United States has an obvious interest in signing a NAFTA-style free trade
agreement with Panama, a largely service-based economy, in which U.S. firms play an
important role. However, Brazil and Argentina, together accounting for nearly twothirds of South America's economic output, are immensely more important as export
markets for U.S. corporations than Panama, the Dominican Republic, and the Andean
countries. The initial U.S. offer for market access for Latin American consumer and
industrial goods, textiles and apparel, and agricultural products is far more attractive
for the Caribbean, Central American, and Andean countries, than for MERCOSUR.
U.S. AgriculturalImports Offered Immediate Duty-free Treatment Under FTAA
CARICOM countries
Central American countries
Andean countries
MERCOSUR countries

85%
64%
68%
50%

See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Free Trade Area of the Americas: The
Opportunity for a Hemispheric Marketplace, Fact Sheet, available at http://www.ustr.gov/
regions/whemisphere/ftaa.shtml (Feb. 11, 2003) [hereinafter HEMISPHERIC MARKETPLACE].
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uct represents 90% of the North American economy). As Cameron and Tomlin put it:
This meant that a negotiator for the United States could say
to counterparts in Mexico and Canada: You want access to
our US$7 trillion market, and you offer in exchange access to
your US$250 and US$500 billion markets? You are going to
have to pay for that access, and here is what it is going to cost
yOU ....

91

Although the U.S. economy is ten times larger than the Brazilian economy, Brazil has much more bargaining power with
the United States in 2003 than Mexico in 1993 for several reasons. First, Brazil is negotiating as the leader of a sub-regional
bloc (MERCOSUR) with a common position, which enhances its
bargaining power. Second, the international and ideological
context is different. Developing countries are openly challenging the EU and the United States over agricultural subsidies in
the Doha round of global trade talks and the backlash against
neo-liberal reforms in Latin America has de-legitimized a
NAFTA-style FTAA which is perceived as more of the same rather
than a genuine alternative to the Latin American economic crisis. Third, Brazil is a global trader. Unlike Mexico, Brazil is not
dependent on trade with the United States, even if the genuine
elimination of non-tariff barriers (such as antidumping measures) to Brazilian exports to the United States would undoubtedly lift the Brazilian economy.
The United States has been unable to impose the same kind
of concessions obtained from Mexico during the NAFTA talks
on Brazil. Gruber's logic of go-it-alone power does not apply to
the FTAA negotiations. The FTAA schedule has not allowed the
United States to control the clock until the final round of negotiations the way it did with the NAFTA talks in 1992 and 1993.92
Although the substance of the FTAA negotiations resembles the
NAFTA agenda, the Trade Negotiations Committee ("TNC")
and the nine negotiating groups have been less prone to U.S.
influence due to the sheer size of the negotiations (thirty-four
countries with very different national interests) and the ability of
MERCOSUR at the March 1998 Trade Ministerial Meeting in
91.

A. CAMERON &
15 (2000).
92. See id. at 175, 225-36.
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San Jose, Costa Rica, to gain concessions from the United States
on the format of the negotiations, including the requirement
that Brazil and the United States would co-chair the final round
of the talks after the Eighth Trade Ministerial Conference in
Miami.
Brazil has few defensive incentives for free trade bandwagoning with the United States and strong incentives not to sign up to
a NAFTA-style FTAA. On the other hand, the smaller Latin
American and Caribbean economies have more defensive incentives, including the need "to develop their role as export and
services platforms for larger markets ... [while attracting] ma-

jor world-class investments," 93 to strike bilateral free trade agreements with the United States, and are prepared to pay entry fees
in areas such as government procurement, and protection of intellectual property and foreign investment, that are unacceptable for Brazil. Yet, the smaller economies have strong disincentives to join a NAFTA-style FTAA without compensatory mechanisms, similar to those provided by the European Union to the
lesser developed European countries and regions.9" Whether
these countries join a NAFTA-style FTAA through bilateral deals
with the United States (a revived hub-and-spokes model) or
whether they abandon the FTAA process and join a South American trading bloc depends on the number of concessions
MERCOSUR is prepared to make in the Andean CommunityMERCOSUR free trade talks.9 5
After the Miami compromise, the dim prospects for achieving an FTAA in 2005 increase the incentives for MERCOSUR to
strike a free trade deal with the Andean Community creating a
SAFFA-minus Chile trading bloc that would strengthen the South
93. See Jose M. Salazar-Xirinachs, Proliferationof Sub-Regional Trade Agreements in the
Americas: An Assessment of Key Analytical and Policy Issues, OAS Trade Unit Studies, Oct.
2002, at 10.
94. See Sarah Anderson, The Equity Factor and Free Trade: What the Europeans Can
Teach Us, 20 WORLD POL'YJ. 45, 45-51 (2003).
95. In December 2003, MERCOSUR and the Andean Community signed an the
Acuerdo de Complementacion Economica [Economic Complementation Accord] that
falls short of the comprehensive free trade area both blocs were expected to reach by
mid-December 2003. However, the accord has a political meaning, considering that
Peru (a member of the Andean Community) has joined MERCOSUR as an associate
member and it has already signed a free trade agreement in MERCOSUR. By March
31, 2004 MERCOSUR and the Andean Community are scheduled to agree on common
rules of origin for a bioregional free trade area and to iron out their differences regarding the treatment of "sensitive" agricultural and industrial products.
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American countries' bargaining power with the NAFTA countries if the FTAA talks continue beyond 2005. This scenario assumes that Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru would in the
end bandwagon with MERCOSUR rather than with the United
States, preferring Southern solidarity and the prospects for bigger
gains in the global and hemispheric trade talks to limited access
to the U.S. market through bilateral trade deals with the United
States.
CONCLUSION
In Miami, the Western hemisphere trade ministers prevented the FTAA process from collapsing. However, they arrived
at a messy compromise that lends itself to different interpretations. After Miami, a modest FTAA without disciplines in antidumping and agricultural subsidies is the most likely scenario.
From now on, the FTAA process is supposed to take place at two
levels. First, the search for "a common and balanced set of
rights and obligations applicable to all countries . . . [and sec-

ondly,] bilateral or plurilateral agreements that may go beyond
the minimum of disciplines agreed upon at the first level.9 6
There is only one important deadline- September 30, 2004, for
improving market access conditions for products. However,
there are no deadlines set for thorny issues like agricultural tariffs and government contracts. Before Miami, the United States
had threatened to build the FTAA with or without Brazil 9 7 but it
soon became apparent that without Brazil there would be no real
FTAA. On the other hand, Brazil had long-insisted that agricultural subsidies be negotiated at the FTAA, not in the WTO,
where the negotiations could drag on indefinitely due to the reluctance of the European Union and Japan to renounce to their
own farm subsidies. By excluding the controversial issues from
the first level of negotiations, the trade ministers paid the price
of settling for a modest IFTAA comprising only a few common
standards and some tariff cuts; a far cry from the ambitious project of eliminating trade barriers from Alaska to Tierra del
Fuego, launched at the Miami Summit of the Americas in 1994.
One of the virtues of the FTAA project was that it was aimed at
96. See Ministerial Declaration of Miami, supra note 74, at 2.
97. See Greider & Rapoza, supra note 37, at 12; see generally Trade in the Americas:
Much Wind and Little Light, THE EcoNOMIST, Oct. 18, 2003, at 35.
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simplifying the spaghetti bowl of overlapping free trade agreements in the hemisphere, homogenizing rules of origin, thus facilitating business activities throughout the Americas.9 The
Miami compromise will increase the complexity of overlapping
free trade agreements in the Western hemisphere. The emerging "patchwork of minideals . . . [is] potentially unfair to those
countries that have made greater concessions to Washington."9 9
The Miami Trade Ministerial Conference illustrates the limitations faced by the United States in its attempt to reassert hegemony in Latin America. Despite President Bush's initial interest in developing a balanced new partnershipwith Latin America,
the U.S. conviction that it has a naturalright to achieve and exercise hegemony in the Americas is alive and well.1" ° The United
States likes to believe that it is a benevolent hegemon that does
not seek unilateral (non-reciprocal) advantages and that uses its
power to provide for the common good of "free trade.""' a However, the United States has increasingly become a protectionist
power. In March 2002, President Bush imposed new steel import tariffs under the escape clause of section 201 of U.S. trade
law.' °2 In May 2002, Congress approved a new farm bill that provides between fifteen and twenty billion U.S. dollars per year in
subsidies to U.S. farmers.
After the Cancun debacle and at the Eighth Ministerial
Meeting in Miami, the United States exercised coercive, rather
than benevolent leadership. Brazil and MERCOSUR successfully
managed to balance U.S. power. Yet the trade ministers' decision to go ahead with a less ambitious FJAA should not be interpreted as a Brazil/MERCOSUR victory but rather as a draw between the United States and MERCOSUR, showing that despite
the asymmetric distribution of power in the Western hemi98. See Salazar-Xirinachs, supra note 93, at 16.
99. Free Trade, a la Carte, supra note 73, at A28.
100. Lowenthal coined the phrase "hegemonic presumption" to describe this persistent U.S. attitude toward Latin America. See Abraham Lowenthal, Two Hundred Years
of American Foreign Policy: The United States and Latin America: Ending the Hegemonic Presumption, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 201, 210 (Oct. 1976).
101. "We have a great vision before us: a fully democratic hemisphere, bound
together by good will and free trade." HEMISPHERIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 90 (quoting George W. Bush speaking at the Third Summit of the Americas on April 21, 2001).
102. The steel tariffs were cancelled on December 4, 2003 to avoid retaliatory tariffs from the European Union and Japan. See Dan Freedman, Steel May Test Bush Mettle,
SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, Dec. 5, 2003, at IA.
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sphere, the Southern Cone countries are now makers and not
simply takers of international policy, having decided to take their
destiny into their own hands. This is summarized in Argentine
foreign minister Rafael Bielsa's explanation of why Argentina
stood with Brazil in Miami, "[i]f the US hopes that our countries
'10 3
will be subservient, they are sadly mistaken.'
The United States undoubtedly faces domestic political constraints to make meaningful concessions to its Latin American
counterparts in the FTAA talks. Yet without a change of U.S.
attitude toward Latin America, seeking a genuine partnership
with its neighbors to the South and an equal balance of rights
and obligations, Brazil and its MERCOSUR partners will continue distancing themselves from the colossus of the North. They
will seek to consolidate a South American bloc and alternative
partnerships with other economic powers, such as China, and
Southern blocs, like the Southern African Development Community ("SADC") and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN"). A successful conclusion of a free trade agreement with the European Union would enhance MERCOSUR's
bargaining power in the FTAA talks and in possible four plus one
trade negotiations with the United States.
The U.S. strategy of reasserting its hegemony in Latin
America through NAFTA-style deals with individual countries
may not work if Brazil manages to counter the discredited Washington Consensus with a South American Consensus and a South
American Free Trade Area in 2004. If U.S. policy makers can
overcome their deep-seated image of Latin American elites as
dependent, a mature partnership between the United States and
South America is a real possibility. However, this is a very big
"if"considering the hegemonic tendencies of the Bush administration.
The history of the FTAA negotiations shows the difficulties
faced by the United States in consolidating hegemony over Latin
America and the important role played by MERCOSUR as a
counterweight to the exercise of U.S. structural power in the region. 11 4 The stalled Doha round of global trade negotiations
and the prospects for (at best) a modest FTAA in 2005 show that
U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick's strategy of competi103. Greider & Rapoza, supra note 37, at 12.
104. See CARRANZA, OPEN REGIONALISM, supra note 20, at 131-32.
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tive trade liberalizationis in trouble. If the United States is really
interested in opening the Southern Cone market for U.S. exports and investments, it should reconsider its refusal to discuss
agricultural subsidies and U.S. antidumping actions in the
FTAA. The U.S. should also recognize the Latin American countries' legitimate demand for a fair FTAA which would truly contribute to the region's economic and social development and
help lift millions of Latin Americans from absolute poverty. The
FTAA has political implications aside the economic effects. In
the absence of major concessions on the part of the United
States, strong opposition across Latin America to a NAFTA-style
FTAA could sound the death knell for the FTAA and end the
fragile Brazilian-U.S. partnership. Thus, disillusionment with
the United States in Latin America would increase, and a new
chapter may begin in the troubled history of U.S.-Latin American relations.

